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1 After  several  decades  in  which the  United  States  government  increased its  financial
support for social science research, social scientists in the US were confronted in the
early  1980s  with  an  attempt,  by  a  newly  elected  President,  to  significantly  reduce
governmental funding for their research. Within weeks of Ronald Reagan’s election in
late 1980, members of his transition team identified social science research budgets as a
target for significant cuts in their new program of financial austerity.  In the months
following  his  inauguration  in  January,  1981,  Reagan’s  new  administration  proposed
budget cuts in the National Science Foundation (NSF), striking most deeply at the budget
for the Division of Social and Economic Sciences.
2 The US government established the National Science Foundation (NSF) in the 1940s to
provide financial support for scientific research in the country’s universities. One of the
early  policy  debates  about  the foundation was  related to  whether  support  for  social
science research should be included in its mandate1. A compromise decision ultimately
stipulated that support  for social  science research should not be prohibited,  and the
foundation gradually increased the financial resources available for research in the social
sciences.  By  1980,  the  NSF  was  supporting  research  in  economics,  political  science,
sociology, geography, anthropology, the history and philosophy of science, psychology
and finally,  law and social  science.  It  was,  in fact,  the principal  source of  grants for
primary social science research in universities in the United States.
3 The Reagan Administration proposed to reduce the budget for the foundation’s Division
of Social and Economic Science (SES) in the following fiscal year by 75%. This would have
widespread ramifications  in  the social  sciences.  The Division of  Social  and Economic
Science encompassed all the social science disciplines in the NSF, with the exception of
anthropology  and  psychology,  which  were  grouped  with  the  neural  sciences  in  the
Foundation’s  Division of  Behavioral  and Neural  Sciences  (BNS).  A budget  cut  of  that
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magnitude in SES would have affected all of these disciplines. BNS also was scheduled for
budget  cuts  largely  focusing  on  the  social  science  programs  of  anthropology  and
psychology.
4 The SES’s research budgets were, however, not the administration’s only targets. Social
science  research  programs  in  other  federal  agencies  were  also  identified  for  budget
reductions, and the administration proposed to eliminate additional government social
science  programs.  The  research  community  viewed these  cuts  as  being  very  serious
indeed, primarily because of their potential to hamper the social sciences by critically
reducing the basic research that was being conducted in these fields.
5 To most social scientists, these decisions were as unwarranted as they were unexpected.
The  only  rationale  provided for  the  administration’s  budget  cuts  was  that  the  work
supported by these funds was of relative low priority, a standard rationale used to explain
many  of  the  budget  cuts  under  the  Reagan  Administration.  Due  to  this  lack  of  a
distinguishing rationale, social scientists accused President Reagan and his Director of
the  Office  of  Management  and  Budget,  David  Stockman,  a  former  Republican
Congressman from Michigan, of taking an ideological approach to national policy. These
scientists, more importantly, mounted a protracted political campaign in Washington for
the first time, actively lobbying the US Congress against the administration’s proposed
budget for fiscal year 1982.
6 Their efforts were surprisingly successful. By 1982, the official position of the Reagan
Administration regarding government support for social science research had softened,
and the social science research budgets of a number of government agencies had been
restored or were in the process of being restored. This would not have happened without
the political activism of social scientists, who lobbied Congress to restore their research
budgets.
7 The impact of these political activities, however, went beyond the congressional budget
process. The social science community was altered by its organized political response to
this threat. The long-term impacts of this activism were not clear at the time, though in
retrospect one can see that this ordeal gave birth to a stronger, more self-conscious social
science community that was better able to defend itself against opposition. This article
will examine the background and the response to the Reagan Administration’s budget
proposals  of  1981.  It  will  also  examine  the  long-range  impacts  of  the  social  science
community’s response to this threat.
Background
8 There has been a long tradition of social  science involvement in public policy in the
United States. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, social scientists were
deeply engaged in efforts to use research as a means of battling poverty and poor living
conditions in America’s cities, which were rapidly expanding due to industrialization and
large-scale  immigration  from  Europe.  Much  of this  work  was  centered  at  Columbia
University and the University of Chicago, both of which were located in major urban
centers2.
9 By  the  1920s,  social  science  research,  influenced  in  part  by  availability  of  financial
support from new private foundations,  began to shift  its focus from social  reform to
social  theory3.  The  result  was  a  blossoming  of  urban  social  science  research  with
theoretical rather than policy goals. Yet social science interest in public policy did not
disappear. Instead, it found expression in an involvement in policy and planning at the
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national level. This practice was initially encouraged by then-President Herbert Hoover,
who  invited  social  scientists  to  evaluate  recent  social trends  with  an  eye  toward
improving national policy, and was continued by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt4.
Social scientists also made significant contributions to the war effort in the early 1940’s5.
10 In the years following World War II, American universities expanded rapidly to meet the
educational needs of returning soldiers. The number of professors in the social sciences
grew to accommodate this post-war influx of students.  The post-World War II  period
marked a change in the political economy of social science research. Financial support for
social  science  research  from  private  foundations  continued  as  before  the  war,  but
growing federal spending for social research gradually dwarfed private support.
11 Federal research expenditures significantly increased the financial resources available for
social  science  research.  Fortunately,  this  rise  coincided  with  a  growing  demand  for
research funding resulting from changes in the nature of social science research. At the
time, there was a growing emphasis on international and area studies research, which
required  social scientists  to  conduct  their  research  abroad.  Conversely,  domestically
oriented social science research became increasingly dependent upon large-scale sample
surveys, which were expensive to conduct and usually required external funding6.
12 Although it went unremarked at the time, the social science research community grew
increasingly dependent on the growing federal expenditures for social science research.
It must be noted, however, that social scientists who received financial support from the
federal government were not constrained by the government in any way. They retained,
of course, their freedom of speech and their right to express their opinions because they
were generally employed by the universities where they were protected by the tenure
system. Their dependence on the government had little effect on their intellectual or
scholarly freedom of inquiry, and consequently few social scientists paid attention to the
politics of the congressional budget process or its impact on social sciences.
13 Far more important than political  influence on the overall  research budget were the
processes used to decide which research proposals to support. In the NSF, for example,
funding decisions were made by a peer review system, organized by program officers in
each discipline. In this system, social scientists in the universities evaluated the proposals
submitted to the NSF according to the quality of the research, and government social
scientists made the final funding decision based on this input. In effect, the social science
research community controlled the selection process for NSF grants.
14 In other government agencies, these decisions were made by government officials with
sectional research responsibilities and were based on both the quality of the research and
the research needs of the agency. Regardless of their participation in the review and
funding of research proposals,  the growing dependence of social scientists on federal
budgets – budgets that were determined by political rather than social scientific criteria –
was a direct result of the expansion of government research funding in the 1960s and
1970s.
15 If the social science community ignored the political debate regarding federal research
budgets and public policy for research, politicians were very aware of the social sciences.
Periodically, members of Congress expressed ambivalence or even opposition to the idea
of government support for social science research. In the late 1940s, congressional debate
about establishing what later became the NSF stalled due to the opposition of  many
congressmen to the fact that this new agency would support social science research7.
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16 Somewhat later,  congressional debate erupted again over whether the NSF should be
permitted to expend government funds on a secondary school curriculum that included
social science instruction, in which, for example, students were introduced to such ideas
as senilicide within Arctic cultures. The problem, according to these politicians, was that
social scientists would corrupt American youth by exposing them to such concepts.
17 Among the various fields of science supported by the NSF, the social sciences were unique
as the recipient of, at best, political ambivalence and, at worst, political attack. During
much of this period, physicists, for example, enjoyed great respect from Congress. This
was partly due to their central role in the war effort and the difficult nature of their field.
It was even possible for a physicist to avoid answering a question posed by a congressman
on the grounds that the congressman would not understand the difficult physics concepts
required in the explanation.
18 Social  scientists  did  not  enjoy such political  immunity.  Everyone,  whether  within or
outside the political system, felt qualified to evaluate the work of social scientists. In the
1970s, a number of congressmen began to include examples of unnecessary or unwise
government  expenditures  in  their  budget  speeches.  Increasingly,  these  examples
involved government-sponsored research in the social sciences.
19 Denouncing a NSF grant for the study of religion among the Sherpas of the Himalayas, for
instance, provided an effective means of attacking the budget of a science agency without
having to display one’s ignorance about physics or chemistry. It was also an attack that
stimulated no retaliation.  There was  no political  price  to  be  paid in  belittling social
science research, and there were clear political benefits to be gained from constituents
who enjoyed hearing about government mismanagement. These constituents, however,
were  uneasy  or  uninterested  in  any  discussion  involving  attacks  on  research  in  the
physical  sciences,  considering the difficult,  often inaccessible  nature of  the material.
Thus, congressional attacks on specific social science research grants increased during
the 1970s8.
The Election of 1980 and Its Aftermath
20 With the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the Republican Party regained control of the
White House. Having been out of the White House for just four years, the party had many
people who were well-versed in presidential politics and were prepared to move quickly
to profit from the victory of the 1980 election. They decided to reduce the proposed
Federal  budget  for  fiscal  year  1982  and  to  impose  changes  on  the  government  that
reflected the more conservative viewpoint of President Reagan and his supporters.
21 It is not clear what criteria were used to decide which areas of the federal budget to
reduce. Still, the social sciences, although proportionally a small part of the total budget,
were  clearly  a  high  priority  for  budget  cuts.  The  rationale  behind  this  decision  is
unknown, and the standard explanation that these fields were of relative low priority
does not address the issue of why such comparatively minuscule budgets (in the context
of overall federal expenditure) should be singled out for cuts.
22 The perception that most social scientists were Democrats, and that a reduction in social
science  research  budgets  would  not  jeopardize  Republican  votes,  was  undoubtedly  a
factor. In addition, there was a widespread perception within the Office of Management
and Budget that social science research was concerned largely with issues that could only
be resolved by government action. This perception was undoubtedly influenced by the
highly visible role of social scientists in the Great Society programs of the 1960’s under
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Democratic President Lyndon Johnson9. From the perspective of the newly elected Reagan
Administration, any type of research that fostered a greater government role in social
and  economic  issues  should  be  reduced,  not  expanded.  Finally,  there  were  some
individuals  working  directly  under  Mr.  Stockman  at  the  Office  of  Management  and
Budget who,  as part of  an earlier Republican administration,  had heavily invested in
social science research on law enforcement issues. They later felt that this investment
had been ineffective, and consequently blamed the social scientist who had been funded
to carry out the research.
23 In February, 1981, the Reagan Administration announced that the federal budget initially
proposed  by  President  Jimmy  Carter  for  the  coming  year  would  be  revised.  In  the
proposed revisions, social science research budgets were cut back dramatically, with the
deepest  cuts  proposed for  the NSF’s  Division of  Social  and Economic Science (SES)10.
Focusing the largest cuts on the SES not only reduced the funding available for university
social  scientists  to  conduct  basic  research,  but  it  also  had  a  negative  effect  on  the
recruitment of students who were considering careers in the social sciences.
24 Fortunately  for  the  social  scientists,  these  budgetary  decisions  made  by  the  Reagan
Administration were viewed as threatening by natural scientists as well. Although many
natural scientists were unimpressed by social science, the Reagan budget cuts made them
feel  vulnerable.  Although  they  were  opposed  to  the  seemingly  arbitrary  political
determination  of  social  scientific  research,  they  also  believed  that  if  social  science
budgets could be cut so drastically for ideological, rather than scientific, motives, there
was nothing to stop elected officials from cutting research budgets in the physical or
biological sciences. As a result, a large number of leading natural scientists spoke out
publicly in opposition to the social science research budget cuts.
The Response of the Social Science Community
25 Social scientists responded quickly to these threats. It has been speculated that if the
Reagan  Administration’s  budget  cuts  had  been  less  drastic,  the  response  by  social
scientists would have been more muted and less organized. Under the circumstances,
however, the proposed cuts appeared so threatening that social scientists ignored their
previous  assumptions  about  what  constituted  legitimate  professional  activities.  They
rallied to the support of  federal  social  science programs,  particularly the NSF.  Social
scientists contacted the Director of the NSF and members of the National Science Board,
the  governing  board  of  the  Foundation,  in  opposition  to  the  cuts.  Most  important,
however, they created a formal, registered lobbying group to fight these threats in the
political arena.
26 In the United States, the various social science disciplines had formed associations that
published scientific  journals,  held  annual  meetings and played an  active  role  in  the
advancement of their disciplines. In early 1981, at the suggestion of the head of the Social
Science Research Council, the directors of a number of these associations met to discuss a
joint response to the budgetary crisis. The associations represented at these meetings
included the American Political Science Association, the American Anthropological
Association,  the  American  Psychological  Association,  the  American  Association  of
Geographers, the American Sociological Association, the Linguistic Society of America,
the American Economic Association, the American Historical Association, the Association
of American Law Schools and the American Statistical Association. This group had met
informally  in  the  past  and  at  one  point  had  even  decided  to  establish  a  formal
organization, which they called the Consortium of Social Science Associations (COSSA).
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But the interests of the individual associations had always taken priority to those of the
social sciences as a whole, and this new organization had never been formally created.
Facing major cuts to social science research budgets, however, COSSA decided to establish
a temporary office and hire a staff to lobby Congress.
27 A bit of background about the political process may be helpful. In the American political
system,  the  separation  of  powers  provides  that  annual  budgets  for  expenditures  by
government agencies are first proposed by the President and then approved by Congress.
In  this  process  Congress  can,  and  frequently  does,  alter  the  budget  that  has  been
presented. Finally, the President must sign the congressional budget.
28 In 1980, prior to the election, President Jimmy Carter prepared a budget for the fiscal
year 1982 that was, however, never sent to Congress for approval. When they came to
power,  the  Reagan  Administration  altered  it  considerably  before  submitting  it  to
Congress.  It  was  at  this  stage  in  the  congressional  approval  process  that  COSSA
intervened  by  lobbying  to  persuade  Congress  to  restore  the  social  science  research
funding eliminated by the Reagan Administration.
29 The story of how COSSA was initially established has been told elsewhere and I will not go
into  detail  here11.  In  brief,  rather  than  hiring  an  experienced,  professional  lobbyist,
COSSA hired two people – Joan Buchanan, a classicist with public policy experience, and
myself, a historian and social scientist. Neither of us had direct political experience, but
working with the COSSA Executive Committee, we devised a strategy that concentrated
COSSA’s efforts on wining the support of congressmen who had large universities in their
districts. Social scientists in these districts visited, telephoned and sent letters to their
representatives to show voter support for social science. We also focused our efforts on
members of both the Democratic and Republican parties in order to emphasize that the
issue of social science research funding should be considered outside the normal partisan
framework.
30 The  lobbying  was  effective  both  in  restoring  social  science  research  budgets  and  in
creating a visible political presence for social scientists. Neither of these goals could have
been accomplished without the sustained support of a number of groups: social scientists
in universities across the United States, social scientists in government (who were legally
prohibited  from  lobbying),  leaders  within  the  natural  science  and  science  policy
communities and organizations such as the American Association for the Advancement of
Science.  Rather  than  a  temporary  response  to  a  crisis,  COSSA  became  a  permanent
organization that has now operated for almost 20 years. Several other advocacy groups
were formed around this time concentrating on government statistics, the behavioral and
psychological  sciences  and  the  humanities.  Together,  a  number  of  these  groups
successfully lobbied the NSF to form a separate directorate for the social, behavioral, and
economic sciences in 1991.
Long Term Impacts
31 During the period of the Reagan budget cuts, social scientists responded to the external
political threats to their research funding with a militant political response. When the
budgetary threats receded after 1982, the social sciences in the United States had been
changed in both overt and subtle ways. From today’s perspective, twenty years later,
some of  these changes,  such as  the establishment of  a  permanent Washington-based
infrastructure for political advocacy on behalf of the social sciences, are clearly evident.
In other ways,  however,  the political  threats reinforced separatist  tendencies already
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present in the social sciences and made certain types of scientific and policy changes
more difficult to accomplish.
32 One of the most significant results of the Reagan budget cuts was the creation of a nation-
wide, politically aware community of social scientists. Because the Administration took
political action against the social sciences, the response to these attacks was mounted in
the name of the social sciences as a whole as opposed to one particular discipline. A group
of  previously  disparate  and  independent  disciplines  committed  themselves  to  work
together by creating COSSA, an organization that represented them collectively.
33 Although the general public had long tended to group the social sciences together, social
scientists usually did not. They rarely thought about their identity as social scientists.
Only a small group of individuals, including the leadership of social science organizations,
such  as  the  Social  Science  Research  Council,  and  federal  employees  responsible  for
overseeing social  research programs in the government,  routinely identified with the
social  sciences  as  a  single  entity  prior  to  the  attempted  budget  cuts.  After  the
politicization of the social sciences in response to these cuts, however, social scientists
were much more likely to see themselves as part of a larger social science community.
34 Similarly, the political crisis of the early 1980s forced the universities to defend the social
sciences. Previously, university lobbyists in Washington had concentrated their efforts on
those  federal  research  and  educational programs  that  provided  large  sums  to  the
universities.  The  social  science  research  programs  were  generally  not  given  much
attention, as their budgets were only rarely of the same magnitude as those destined for
educational programs or for the natural sciences. The size and virulence of the social
science budget cuts of 1981 forced these university representatives to devote time and
attention to issues that concerned the social science faculty. Moreover, the universities
themselves,  recognizing  the  importance  of  social  science  advocacy  to  their  faculties,
made financial contributions to maintain COSSA.
35 After the first year of the Reagan Administration, when it had abandoned its attempts to
decimate social science research programs, the institutional infrastructure of the social
sciences had permanently changed. By that time, COSSA was an established organization,
incorporated as a not-for-profit non-governmental organization, rather than an ad hoc
response to a temporary crisis. It had a professional staff of lobbyists and representatives
who monitored the political process in Washington to identify any budgetary or policy
problems that might effect the social science community.
36 Nor was COSSA alone. By the end of the crisis, there were a number of groups that had
been formed to serve as advocates for researchers in the social sciences. Statisticians
established the Consortium of Professional Associations in Federal Statistics (COPAFS),
and disciplines in the humanities such as history and languages created a lobbying group
to support the research budget of the National Endowment for the Humanities.
37 Psychologists, numerically the largest discipline within the social sciences, created their
own  lobbying  group  for  behavioral  science  research.  The  American  Psychological
Association  (APA),  which  was  considerably  larger  than  the  other  social  science
disciplinary  associations,  employed  a  lobbyist,  as  did  the  independent  Federation  of
Behavioral,  Cognitive,  and  Psychological  Sciences.  Somewhat  later,  a  group  of
psychologists broke away from the APA and formed the American Psychological Society,
which had a strong lobbying emphasis.
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38 The political infrastructure represented by these organizations was considerable. There
was  a  professional  lobbying  staff  working  on  behalf  of  the  social  sciences  and  a
communications system in place to ensure that the social science community outside
Washington would not be caught unaware by political attempts to reduce their resources.
After  the  events  of  1981,  social  scientists  themselves  were  more  sophisticated about
budgetary and policy issues. They had successfully defeated sweeping budget reductions
by a new conservative administration that was attempting to use the federal budgetary
process  to  reverse  the  policies  of  a  previous  administration.  In  doing  so,  they  had
mounted an effort that resulted in the highest congressional vote against the Reagan
Administration’s budget proposals that year. This success created a new militancy in the
social science community.
39 The crisis of 1981-1982 also resulted in strong public expression of support for the social
sciences by natural scientists.  The social  and natural sciences previously had little in
common and many natural  scientists  feared that too close an association with social
scientists would weaken their own position in political budget discussions. In the 1980s,
instead of isolating the social sciences, however, the Reagan budget cuts led to a working
alliance between social and natural scientists. Natural scientists recognized that the two
fields shared common concerns and vulnerabilities, and thus supported the cause of the
social sciences.
40 The political support of the natural scientists was also valuable in subsequent years in
discussions  of  science  policy,  where social  science  began to  be  included,  and in  the
development of new multidisciplinary fields of research. For example, in the 1980s and
1990s, as national and international policy leaders began to recognize the significant role
played by mankind in the deterioration of the global environment, it was clear that social
science was a critical component of the research necessary to understand the dynamics of
environmental  change.  Nevertheless,  riding  on  the  success  of  defeating  the  Reagan
Administration’s  attempt to cut  their  budgets  and fearful  of  being relegated to an «
auxiliary support role », social scientists were often reluctant to join natural scientists in
multidisciplinary research activities.
41 Twenty years later, it is clear that there were other changes that may have come about as
a  result  of  this  politicization  that  never  materialized.  There  was,  for  example,  little
introspection after the events of 1981-1982 about the relationship between the social
sciences  and  the  Federal  government.  The  operating  assumption  that  the  Federal
government had a responsibility to support social science research was rarely questioned.
42 The basic justification for public support of the natural sciences since World War II had
been utility, and the social sciences adopted the same approach in their battle against the
budget  cuts.  The  defense  of  the social  sciences  in  1981-1982  usually  rested  on  its
demonstrated  utility  to  government  and society.  But  such issues as  the  value  of  an
oppositional social science, the implications of government control of research foci and
problem selection, the political use of social science for public policy, and even ethical
issues related to social engineering, were not addressed and were rarely voiced.
43 The events of 1981-1982 significantly altered the position of the social sciences within the
politics of science in the United States and contributed to a stronger, more unified social
science community. It is time for that community, which now has considerable political
sophistication, to better understand its intellectual role in society. In a sense, the Reagan
Administration’s budget cuts struck not only at the financial support of social science
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research and the professional legitimacy of that work, but also at the ideological and
political implications of the use of such research in a system of governance. At this point,
federal financial support for social science research has stabilized and continues to grow,
and the professional legitimacy of these fields is unquestioned. The next steps for social
scientists are to go beyond these fundamental issues, important as they are, in order to
weigh the future roles that they may play in the service of society.
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